Case Name: Pramod Kumar Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.

Petition No.: SLP (Crl.) No. 12908 of 2025

Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 887

Date of Judgment: 19.08.2026

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Hon’ble Mr. Justice N.V. Anjaria

Relevant Statutes and Provisions: Section 154, Section 156(3), Section 173(8), Section 482, Section 190 of Cr.PC., Section 11 of CPC and Article 226, Constitution of India.

(The judgment concerns whether rejection of an application under Section 156(3) Cr.PC. prevents the subsequent registration of an FIR on the same or substantially similar allegations, and whether such rejection attracts the doctrine of res judicata.)

In this judgment, the Court was called upon to determine whether the rejection of an earlier application under Section 156(3) Cr.PC. would prevent the subsequent registration of an FIR based on the same or substantially similar allegations. The Court held that such rejection does not amount to a final adjudication on the merits and, therefore, does not attract the doctrine of res judicata so as to bar subsequent criminal proceedings.

FACTS

The complainant alleged that the appellant represented himself as having influence in the Directorate of Education, Prayagraj, and could secure appointments for his son and grandson in return for ₹20 lakh. Various amounts were allegedly transferred to the appellant’s bank account. When the promised appointments did not materialise and repayment was demanded, the appellant allegedly abused and threatened the complainant and his family. On the basis of these allegations, an FIR was registered for offences under Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 504 and 506 IPC. Prior to registration of the FIR, however, the complainant had approached the Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.PC. The Magistrate, after obtaining a police report, rejected the application in September 2024, observing that the police report indicated a dispute concerning a land transaction. The revision against that order was also dismissed. Aggrieved by the registration of the FIR, the appellant approached the Allahabad High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking quashing of the FIR and consequential proceedings. The High Court declined to interfere, holding that rejection of the earlier Section 156(3) application did not constitute a bar to registration of an FIR where the subsequent information disclosed a cognizable offence. The appellant thereafter approached the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the High Court was justified in declining to quash the subject FIR and the proceedings arising therefrom, despite the rejection by the learned Magistrate of an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC founded on substantially the same allegations. 

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT 

• The Appellant contended that FIR amounted to a second round of proceedings on substantially identical allegations, which had already been considered and rejected by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.PC., with the rejection subsequently affirmed in revision.

• The Appellant argued that, since the earlier Section 156(3) application had been rejected after consideration of the Police report and the order had attained finality, the appellant argued that the complainant could not circumvent that order by subsequently setting the criminal law in motion on the same allegations. Reliance was placed on Mohan Karthik v. State of Tamil Nadu.

• The Appellant submitted that, even if the allegations in the FIR were accepted at face value, the essential ingredients of Sections 420, 406, 467 and 471 IPC were not made out, warranting exercise of the High Court’s quashing jurisdiction.

• The Appellant also contended that the underlying transaction was civil and legally void: The appellant maintained that he and the complainant had a longstanding commercial/property-dealing relationship and that the dispute arose from land and monetary transactions. It was further argued that the alleged arrangement to secure public employment through influence was void under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and therefore could not furnish a valid basis for criminal liability.

• Furthermore, FIR was mala fide and constituted abuse of process: The appellant contended that the FIR was lodged mala fide after the rejection of the Section 156(3) application and therefore fell within Category (7) of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal. On this basis, he sought quashing of the FIR and all consequential proceedings.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

• The Respondent contended that the FIR was based on fresh incriminating material, including an audio recording, monetary transaction details and forged documents, which were not before the Magistrate earlier.

• The Respondent further argued that, rejection of an application under Section 156(3) Cr.PC. did not legally bar the police from subsequently registering an FIR upon receipt of fresh material. Reliance was placed on V. Ravi Kumar, Shivshankar Singh and Anju Chaudhary.

• The Respondent also contented that the FIR disclosed cognizable offences, particularly as the appellant had received money in his bank account. His defence that the payments related to another transaction was a matter requiring investigation, not adjudication at the FIR-quashing stage.

• The Respondent relying on M/s Jayant Vitamins Ltd. v. Chaitanyakumar, the State argued that investigation falls within the statutory domain of the police and courts should interfere only for compelling and justifiable reasons.

• Furthermore, the respondent contended that, appellant’s involvement in five other FIRs containing substantially similar allegations was relied upon to support the prosecution’s case and demonstrate why the matter required a full investigation rather than quashing at the threshold.

JUDGEMENT ANALYSIS

• Nature and Scope of Section 156(3) Cr.PC

The Supreme Court explained that Sections 154, 156(3) and 190 of the Cr.PC. together constitute a structured statutory mechanism for setting the criminal law in motion. Ordinarily, the aggrieved person is required to first approach the police under Section 154 for registration and investigation of the offence. If the police fail or refuse to act, the person may then invoke the Magistrate’s jurisdiction under Section 156(3) and seek a direction for investigation. Section 190, however, confers an independent power upon the Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence not only on the basis of a police report, but also upon receiving a complaint or information from any person other than a police officer, or upon the Magistrate’s own knowledge. 

• Rejection of Section 156(3) Application Does Not Attract Res Judicata

The central ruling of the judgment was that rejection of a Section 156(3) application does not possess the character of a final adjudication on merits. Consequently, such rejection cannot operate as res judicata to prevent subsequent registration of an FIR based on the same or substantially similar allegations. The Court relied upon S.C. Garg v. State of Uttar Pradesh and reconciled earlier authorities concerning the application of res judicata in criminal proceedings. It emphasised that the doctrine depends upon the nature and legal effect of the earlier proceeding. Where there has been no final adjudication on merits, the doctrine does not operate as a bar.

• Independent Duty of Police to Register FIR 

The Court further held that rejection of an application under Section 156(3) Cr.PC. neither decides the merits of the allegations nor absolves the police of their independent statutory duty under Sections 154 and 156 Cr.PC. The obligation to register and investigate a cognizable offence flows directly from the Code and is not dependent upon any prior direction of the Magistrate under Section 156(3). Therefore, where information subsequently furnished to the police prima facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the police are bound to register an FIR in accordance with law. Relying upon the Constitution Bench judgment in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, the Court reiterated that at the stage of registration, the police are concerned only with whether the information ex facie discloses a cognizable offence; the truthfulness, credibility and evidentiary value of the allegations are matters for investigation and cannot be used as grounds to refuse registration. Thus, rejection of a Section 156(3) application does not operate as a bar against subsequent registration and investigation of an FIR on the basis of information independently furnished to the police.

• Limited Scope of Quashing Jurisdiction

The Court reiterated that while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.PC. for quashing criminal proceedings, the Court is primarily required to examine whether the allegations contained in the FIR, if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, prima facie disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. At this preliminary stage, the Court is not expected to conduct a mini-trial or undertake a detailed examination of the correctness, reliability or probative value of the material relied upon by either side, nor determine which version of the facts is more probable. Where the allegations, taken as a whole, disclose the essential ingredients of cognizable offences, the matter ordinarily warrants investigation and should not be stifled at the threshold. In the present case, the allegations relating to inducement, receipt of money on the promise of securing government employment, use of allegedly forged documents and subsequent threats were, on their face, sufficient to prima facie disclose cognizable offences, thereby falling outside the limited scope of interference under Section 482 Cr.PC.

Therefore, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding no perversity in the High Court’s decision refusing to quash the FIR. It categorically held that rejection of an application under Section 156(3) Cr.PC. is not a final adjudication on merits and therefore does not bar subsequent registration or continuation of criminal proceedings by operation of res judicata.