Case Name: MAURICE W. INNIS VERSUS LILY KAZROONI @ LILY ARIF SHAIKH
Petition Number: Special Leave Petition (C) No. 8166 of 2022
Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 340
Date of Judgement: 09.04.2026
Coram: HON’BLE MR JUSTICE PANKAJ MITHAL & HON’BLE MR JUSTICE PRASANNA B. VARALE
INTRODUCTION
The present appeal before the Supreme Court arose from a dispute regarding the execution of a compromise decree passed in a suit for specific performance. The core legal issue examined by the Court was whether an Executing Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), possesses the power to modify or vary the specific terms of a final compromise decree on the grounds of “practicability” or convenience
FACTS
The dispute involved 51R of land in Panchgani, Maharashtra. The plaintiff (appellant) originally filed a suit for specific performance against the defendant (respondent) based on an agreement to sell. During the pendency of the suit, the parties entered into a compromise on 08.07.2017.
According to the compromise decree, out of the 51R of land, 10R was to remain as common land for access. The remaining 41R was to be equally divided, with 20.5R falling to the share of each party. The decree specifically demarcated the respective portions, noting that the plaintiff’s share included the residential bungalow and plinth-level constructions, while the defendant’s share was situated on the western side. The defendant was directed to execute a sale deed for the plaintiff’s share for a previously paid consideration of Rs. 10 lakhs.
When the decree was put into execution, the Executing Court passed orders modifying the area of land allotted to the parties. The Executing Court reasoned that the permanent constructions on the extreme western side were not in accordance with the sanctioned plan, would be inconvenient for the defendant, and that the plaintiff had allegedly sold a portion to a third party. Consequently, the Executing Court altered the specific portions of land allotted to the parties. The High Court dismissed the plaintiff’s writ petition, challenging these modifications, which prompted the present appeal.
ISSUE
Whether an Executing Court, acting under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, has the jurisdiction to go beyond a compromise decree and modify its specific terms and land allotments based on practicability or subsequent inconveniences?
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
The Appellant argued that it is a well-settled principle of law that an Executing Court cannot go behind the decree. Its sole duty is to execute the decree exactly as it stands, without making any modifications, substitutions, or alterations to its terms.The Respondent contended that the Executing Court rightly interpreted the decree. The respondent argued that under the peculiar facts of the case, the Executing Court was justified in modifying the allotted portions to ensure the decree did not become inexecutable.
JUDGEMENT AND ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the Executing Court and the High Court. The Court anchored its analysis on Section 47 of the CPC, which mandates that all questions arising between the parties relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree shall be determined by the Executing Court. The Court firmly reiterated the absolute legal principle that an Executing Court has no jurisdiction to go beyond the decree sought to be executed.
Relying on landmark precedents such as Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman (1970) 1 SCC 670 and Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash (1977) 2 SCC 662, the Court noted that an Executing Court must take the decree “according to its tenor” and cannot question its legality or correctness. The only exception to this rule is if the decree is a nullity due to a lack of inherent jurisdiction, which was not the case here. The jurisdiction of the Executing Court is strictly limited to giving effect to the decree; it cannot assume the role of a trial court to substitute its own views. The Supreme Court clarified that while an Executing Court can ensure the compliance of reciprocal obligations, it still has absolutely no jurisdiction to vary the terms of the decree itself.
Applying these principles, the Court found that the compromise decree clearly described the identity and portions of the land falling into the respective shares of the parties. The Executing Court’s decision to alter these portions because the exchange was “not practicable” due to unsanctioned constructions or third-party sales was entirely immaterial and outside its jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court concluded that the Executing Court committed a manifest jurisdictional error by altering the specific allotments of land agreed upon by the parties. The Court held that an Executing Court cannot go behind the decree or vary its terms. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned orders modifying the land allotments and directed the Executing Court to execute the compromise decree strictly in its original terms and tenor.
