Case Name: UNION OF INDIA & ORS. v. BALI RAM NO. 850808321

Petition No.: CIVIL APPEAL No.13783/2015

Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 689

Date of Judgement: 13.07.2026

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dipankar Datta 

Relevant Statutes & Provisions: Section 47 of the Persons with Disability Act and Articles 14 and 21 of the Indian Constitution.

INTRODUCTION 

This case examines the statutory protection available to employees who acquire a disability while in service under Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (PwD Act). The Supreme Court considered whether the respondent’s medical invalidation from the CRPF was lawful, whether the exemption notification issued in 2002 could operate retrospectively, and whether the respondent had relinquished his statutory rights by not expressly claiming them. The judgment reiterates that Section 47 is a mandatory welfare provision intended to safeguard the employment of persons who become disabled during service and cannot be defeated by technical objections or a subsequent exemption.

FACTS

The respondent was enrolled in CRPF as a driver in 1985 as medically fit and continued till 1996, when he developed ophthalmic conditions resulting in complete blindness in  his left eye and partial blindness in his right eye. The Medical Rehabilitation Board found him unfit for driving and combatant duties and referred to the Medical Invalidation Board which in turn found him permanently incapacitated for further service in any capacity vide order dated 11th March, 1998. In response, the respondent made a representation seeking grant of full financial and service benefits. However, the same was rejected by the competent authority which was challenged by the respondent before the High Court, which directed the appellants to consider and decide the grievance. However the authorities once again rejected the respondent’s claim holding that the ailment suffered by him was neither attributable to nor aggravated by service conditions. Thereafter,  the respondent initiated writ petition out of which this appeal is presented.

ISSUE

Whether the Single Judge rightly enforced the appellants’ duty under Section 47 of the PwD Act by making the directions and also as to whether the Division Bench was grossly wrong in not reversing such directions?

ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES 

Appellant submitted that the respondent was granted whatever financial benefits he was entitled to under the prevailing rules/circulars including monthly pension. It was further submitted that the Single Judge erroneously placed reliance upon Section 47 of the PwD Act, as it was wholly misplaced in view of the notification dated 10.10.2002 issued by the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, under proviso to Section 47 of the PwD Act, whereby all categories of combatant personnel of the Central Para Military Forces including the CRPF, were exempted from the application of the said provision and that it travelled beyond what was prayed by the respondent. Further, it was contended that since no claim by respondent was made under Section 47 of PwD Act or for reinstatement, the doctrine of waiver applies. 

On the other hand, the respondent submits that Section 47 thereof, is a social welfare legislation intended to protect employees who acquire a disability during service thus casts a statutory obligation on the employer to protect an employee acquiring disability during service. He further contends that his invalidation order was passed much before issuance of the alleged prospective operating notification. The respondent submitted that he has not waived his claims since, having lost his vision, he was not aware of the protections available to him, thus there is no intentional relinquishment of a known right. 

JUDGMENT AND ANALYSIS 

The Court began with analyzing section 47 of the PwD Act. The Court dealt with each claim of the appellant while it drew guidance from Kunal Singh v UoI (2003) 4 SCC 524. The Court laid down the yardstick to be applied where the pleadings are skeletal and prayers deficient, yet, the material on record establishes that denial of wider relief would perpetuate injustice merely for want of proper legal assistance. The Court referred to Order VII of the CPC which has originated from legal maxim secundum allegata et probata, i.e., the Court will arrive at its decision on the basis of the claims and proof led by the parties, based on fairness as any such action would amount to a new case being made out for parties. However, it is not an inflexible rule concerning writ jurisdictions as justice transcends all barriers, thus conferring wide powers under Article 226. The Court opined that the technicalities cannot triumph over substantive justice when the Court is convinced that the petitioner is legally entitled to more than what has been claimed, but might have claimed less due to ignorance or bona fide mistake or inelegant drafting of the writ petition by his lawyer.

The Court then examined what is waiver and when such a plea can be pursued. In light of settled law, the Court put forth that waiver, in law, is an intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage, benefit, claim or privilege by a person which, except for such waiver, he would have enjoyed. The Court observed the ingredients required to be proved by the party raising the plea, i.e. (i) a person (the other party to the lis against whom waiver is claimed) has a right; (ii) such person has clear knowledge of that right; and (iii) despite the knowledge (of an existing right), that person has voluntarily and consciously given up that right. Mere silence or inaction or delay to enforce the existing right does not constitute waiver, and it is disfavoured when public welfare is concerned. The Court reiterated that whether or not a party has waived his right has to flow from his conduct and is, essentially, a question of fact. The Court further added that it could not find any point of waiver having been pleaded by the appellants either in the LPA or in this appeal. Therefore, it was held that without a pleading, a plea of waiver need not be adjudicated. 

In dealing with the effect of the notification, the Court emphasized three well-settled principles of law. First, delegated legislation is ordinarily prospective in nature and a right or liability created for the first time cannot be given retrospective effect as was laid in Federation of Indian Mineral Industries v. Union of India (2017) 16 SCC 186; secondly, unless and until there is a clear intention expressed in the notification issued in pursuance of delegated power that it would also apply retrospectively, the same cannot be given a retrospective effect and would always operate prospectively as held in Union of India v. Kartick Chandra Mondal (2010) 2 SCC 422; and thirdly, an exemption notification which takes out cases from the purview of a beneficial legislation has to be strictly construed, relying on Mohinder Lal v. Saroj Kumari Verma (2000) 2 SCC 6. 

On the basis of above principles, the Court held that the notification applies prospectively and also that the Act being a beneficial legislation has to be construed strictly. Thus, till exempted, the employer has a duty to offer an alternate post and the employee a right to be accommodated, and upon issuance of the notification, not only does the duty of the employer cease from the date the same takes effect, the employee would lose the statutory protection of continuity in service. The Court reasoned that such exemption has been made seven years after the coming into force of the Act thus applying with full force to the CMPFs and covered them between 1995 and 10.10.2002. Thus, the Court held that the said order dated 11th March, 1998  being ultra vires Section 47 read with Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution as on date the same was made, the subsequent issuance of the notification cannot have retrospective effect so as to legitimize an act that is void ab initio. The right of the respondent crystallised on the date of ouster; and a later exemption from the statutory mandate cannot efface the breach already committed.

Thereafter, the Court proceeded to closely examine the precedents in Kunal Singh, Bhagwat Das v. Punjab State Electricity Board (2008) 1 SCC 579 and Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India (2023) 2 SCC 209, and concluded that statutory mandate under Section 47 cannot be ignored, and that begins with ‘no’, a negative wording, outlining clear prohibition. An employee like the respondent, while retaining the status of a public servant, is entitled to security of service. Either he is shifted to some other post carrying the same pay and service benefits, or, if it is not possible, the employer is under a duty to adjust him to any other post. However, if that is not possible, a supernumerary post has to be created for him which, for all intents and purposes, would be personal to him. 

CONCLUSION 

The Court reached the conclusion that the duty imposed by the PwD Act being mandatory and not discretionary, the law did not leave the appellants with an option to discharge their duty at their convenience.That the respondent was fit at the time of appointment and there is nothing on record to suggest that he had such medical condition since his enrollment. Furthermore, the Parliament did not limit Section 47 to disabilities attributable to service; the protection is unqualified and unconditional. It operates irrespective of how the disability was acquired.

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