Case Name: ALOK KOTAHWALA & ORS. vs. JAIPUR METRO RAIL CORPORATION LIMITED & ORS.
Petition No.: Civil Appeal No.8269 Of 2026
Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 682
Date of Judgement: 13.07.2026
Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dipankar Datta and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Satish Chandra Sharma
Relevant Statutes & Provisions: Sections 4, 5A, 6 and 9(3) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894

INTRODUCTION

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that substantial compliance with Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 suffices where a landowner forfeits a hearing by his own conduct, and that mere existence of trees on acquired land cannot elevate it to “forest” or “deemed forest” so as to invalidate a duly sanctioned project. The Court dismissed appeals challenging acquisition of land for the Jaipur Metro Rail Project’s car depot.

FACTS

A notification was issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (LA Act) proposing to acquire 27 hectares in Village Sheopura, Jaipur, for a metro car depot under Phase II of the Jaipur Metro Rail Project. The appellants filed objections under Section 5A(1); the Land Acquisition Officer (LAO) fixed several hearing dates, only one of which they appeared. After JMRCL’s replies, the matter was posted for rejoinder but the appellants neither appeared nor filed one. The LAO later recorded the objections as “not being considered” and forwarded his report under Section 5A(2), pursuant to which the State Government issued a declaration under Section 6(1). The writ petition was allowed by a Single Judge for want of effective hearing, but a Division Bench reversed this, restoring the acquisition, giving rise to the present appeals.

ISSUES

1. Whether there was substantial compliance with Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894?

2. Whether the objections raised by the appellants had substance?

ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

Senior Counsel for the appellants contended that no effective hearing was granted, since the LAO fixed no further date after 09.04.2012 and abruptly forwarded its report on 18.05.2012 without independent recommendation, relying on Farid Ahmed vs. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad (1976) 3 SCC 719 and Surinder Singh Brar & Ors. v. Union of India (2013) 1 SCC 403. It was further urged that alternative land belonging to RIICO and IOCL was ignored, the acquisition was excessive and uncertain, no urgency existed, and the ecologically sensitive land could not be diverted for commercial use.

The learned Solicitor General submitted that the LAO, being an administrative and not a quasi-judicial authority, was only required to submit recommendations; that the appellants were duly afforded hearing but remained wilfully absent on 09.04.2012; that the State Government independently applied its mind; and that a drone survey showed trees confined to a small portion of the land, relying on Jayantilal Amratlal Shodhan v. F.N. Rana AIR 1964 SC 648.

JUDGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

Regarding the first issue, the Court held that Section 5A engrafts a very valuable right for every landowner and is a mandatory safeguard, requiring the Collector to fix a date of hearing and intimate the landowner without him having to ask for it. Examining the record, however, the Court found that the Appellants, having received JMRCL’s reply, neither filed their rejoinder nor sought an adjournment, and made no effort thereafter to ascertain the outcome until the LAO’s report was made. The Court reasoned that a party might choose not to prosecute its own objection; but the LAO cannot be expected to compel such party to prosecute its objection, and that the non-grant of a further hearing date, though at best an indiscretion, is not malice in law. 

On the sufficiency of the LAO’s report, the Court held that ‘objections are not being considered’ meant they were considered on their own footing but they did not merit acceptance, and since a report under Section 5A need not be a speaking order in the judicial sense, brevity of reasons is not synonymous with absence of reasons. The Court accordingly held that there was substantial compliance with Section 5A, and that the Appellants, having by their own conduct abandoned the hearing, could not complain of its denial.

Regarding the second issue, the Court rejected each objection on its own merits. On the plea that a newspaper publication ought to have preceded the Section 4 notification, the Court found no such statutory requirement and, relying on Narinderjit Singh v. State of U.P. (1973) 1 SCC 157, held the objection untenable, also noting no prejudice since the Appellants had received due notice and filed timely objections. On public purpose, relying on Daulat Singh Surana v. Collector (LA) (2007) 1 SCC 641, the Court held that a metro depot is not an ancillary commercial venture, but an indispensable operational component without which the metro system itself cannot function, and that an evolving DPR does not detract from the essential public purpose. 

In absence of a prior survey, the Court read Section 4(2)’s use of “Thereupon” to mean survey powers arise only after publication of the notification. On alternative land, the Court held, following State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471 and Sooraram Pratap Reddy v. Collector (2008) 9 SCC 552, that selection of land for a public project lies within the domain of expert planning authorities and is ordinarily non-justiciable, particularly since the suggested lands were shown to be earmarked for other public uses. The claim of excessive acquisition was rejected as a bare assertion unsupported by evidence, the revised DPR itself having assessed the requirement at 27 hectares. 

On the ecological objection, applying Naveen Solanki v. Rail Land Development Authority 2026 SCC OnLine SC 45, the Court held that “mere existence [of trees or vegetation]… cannot ipso facto elevate it to the status of a ‘forest’ or ‘deemed forest” unless statutory planning instruments, including the Master Plan, recognise the land as forest land, and no such recognition existed here. Finding no merit in any objection, the Court upheld the Division Bench’s judgment.

CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding the Single Judge erred in interdicting the acquisition solely for non-compliance with Section 5A, and that the Division Bench rightly restored it. The interim order was vacated, with liberty to the Appellants to pursue remedies regarding enhanced compensation. The judgment reaffirms that substantial compliance with Section 5A suffices where a landowner forfeits his own hearing, and that ecological objections require statutory recognition, not mere presence of vegetation.

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