Case Name: Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr.
Petition No: Crl.A. No. 003647 – 003648 of 2026.
Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 784
Date of Judgement: 03.08.2026
Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Karol and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh
Relevant Statutes and Provisions: Section 498A of Indian Penal Code (IPC), Section 482, Section 41, Section 41-A of Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), and Article 14, Article 15, and Article 21 of Constitution of India

(The judgment concerns the scope of Section 498A IPC and whether the expression “husband” can extend beyond a legally valid marriage to a “relationship in the nature of marriage”).
In this judgement, the Court confronted the conflict between strict interpretation of penal statutes and purposive interpretation aimed at suppressing the mischief of cruelty against women. It ultimately held that a woman in a relationship in the nature of marriage may receive the protection of Section 498A, subject to specific safeguards and the requirement of an intent to marry. The court further examined whether the remedies available under the Protection of  Domestic Violence Act,2005 were sufficient, and held that such remedies do not exclude the protective and penal operation of Section 498 A.

FACTS
The dispute arose between the Appellant and Respondent No. 2  regarding the applicability of Section 498A IPC to their relationship. The parties allegedly married according to Hindu customs on 17th October 2010 and subsequently lived together in Bengaluru. Their relationship deteriorated in 2016, following which Respondent No. 2 lodged criminal complaints alleging cruelty, dowry harassment and other offences against the appellant and his family members. The appellant sought quashing of the criminal proceedings, contending that Section 498A applies only to a legally valid marriage and that he could not be treated as a “husband” in the absence of such marriage. The Karnataka High Court rejected the challenge, holding that the relationship possessed the attributes of marriage and could fall within a “relationship in the nature of marriage’’. Aggrieved by this, the appellants reached the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

ISSUES

1. Whether a man who is in a live-in relationship can be prosecuted under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
   
   
2. Whether Section 498A IPC can protect women in a relationship resembling marriage, even though it is a penal provision and remedies are available under the Domestic Violence Act? 
   
   
3. Whether the criminal proceedings against the appellant were liable to be quashed under Section 482 CrPC, and what safeguards, particularly concerning arrest, are applicable to persons accused under Section 498A in such relationships?

CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT

• The Appellant contended that Section 498A IPC, being a penal provision, must be strictly construed, and the expression “husband” therein can only refer to a person who is in a valid and lawful marriage with the woman. A void marriage or a live-in relationship cannot satisfy this statutory requirement.

• It was further argued that mere cohabitation, irrespective of its duration, does not constitute marriage under the existing statutory framework governing marriage. Therefore, a live-in partner cannot be brought within the expression “husband” merely because the parties have lived together.

• The Appellant also submitted that extending Section 498A to relationships other than valid marriages would amount to enlarging a penal provision beyond its statutory language, which is impermissible under the principle of strict construction of penal statutes. Reliance upon the judgement of Shivcharan Lal Verma v. State of Madhya Pradesh and U. Suvetha v. State (2007) 15 SCC 369.

• It was contended that restricting Section 498A to legally recognised marriages would not leave the woman without a remedy, since other provisions of law, including the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, provide protection and remedies in appropriate cases.

• Accordingly, the Appellant maintained that the essential ingredients of Section 498A were not satisfied, and the criminal proceedings initiated against him ought to be quashed under Section 482 CrPC.

CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS

• The Respondent contended that the expression “husband” under Section 498A IPC must be given a purposive construction so as to include persons who enter into a marital relationship and subsequently subject the woman to cruelty, even where the marriage is void or otherwise legally defective.

• It was further contended that the Appellant cannot take advantage of the absence of a legally valid marriage to escape liability where he represented himself as the woman’s husband and subjected her to cruelty. Such an interpretation would allow a wrongdoer to take advantage of his own wrong.

• The Respondent also submitted that Section 498A is a beneficial and protective provision, intended to safeguard women against cruelty and harassment within marital relationships, and therefore ought not to be defeated by a hyper-technical interpretation.

• The Respondent further argued that “Relationship in the nature of marriage” is distinct from an ordinary live-in relationship, and where the relationship possesses the essential characteristics of marriage, the woman is entitled to the protection contemplated by law.

• Accordingly, the criminal proceedings should not be quashed at the threshold where the allegations, taken at their face value, disclose a prima facie case of cruelty, whether the allegations are ultimately proved is a matter for trial and the appeal should consequently be dismissed and the criminal proceedings be permitted to proceed in accordance with law.

JUDGMENT ANALYSIS

 1. Applicability of Section 498A IPC to a “Relationship in the Nature of Marriage”: The Supreme Court first examined whether the expression “husband” in Section 498A IPC necessarily requires a legally valid marriage. The Court did not accept an approach under which a person could escape the protective scope of Section 498A merely because the relationship suffered from a formal legal defect. However, the Court was equally careful not to equate every live-in relationship with marriage. Relying upon D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (2010) 10 SCC 469  and Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma (2013) 15 SCC 755, the Court explained that a “relationship in the nature of marriage” is a narrower category within the broader concept of a live-in relationship and must possess the essential attributes of marriage. Thus, mere cohabitation is insufficient, and the nature, circumstances and intention underlying the relationship must be considered. The Court expressly observed that “all live-in relationships are not relationships in the nature of marriage.” Accordingly, the Court extended the protection of Section 498A only to a qualifying relationship and not to every live-in arrangement.

The Supreme Court held that Section 498A IPC may extend to a genuine “relationship in the nature of marriage,” while every live-in relationship does not qualify as such. The Court declined to quash the proceedings as the allegations prima facie disclosed cognizable offences, while directing strict compliance with arrest safeguards under Arnesh Kumar. Thus, the judgment balances protection against cruelty with safeguards against misuse of criminal law.

 2. Strict Construction vis-à-vis Purposive Interpretation and the DV Act: The Court then considered whether extending Section 498A to such relationships would violate the principle of strict construction of penal statutes. The Court acknowledged that penal provisions must be strictly construed, but explained that strict construction does not require an interpretation which defeats the very purpose of the legislation. Section 498A was enacted as a protective and beneficial provision to address cruelty against women, and therefore its interpretation must also advance that legislative purpose. The Court further rejected the contention that the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 makes Section 498A unnecessary in such cases. It recognised that the two statutes provide different forms of protection: the DV Act primarily provides civil and remedial reliefs, whereas Section 498A creates criminal liability and consequently provides a distinct element of criminal deterrence. The Court therefore adopted a purposive interpretation, while consciously restricting its conclusion to the application of Section 498A and avoiding an unrestricted alteration of the meaning of marriage under other laws.

3. Quashing of Proceedings and Safeguards Against Arrest: After determining the legal position, the Court applied it to the allegations made against the appellant. The Court observed that, at the stage of considering a petition for quashing under Section 482 CrPC, it is not required to determine whether the allegations will ultimately be proved. The relevant question is whether, if the allegations are taken at their face value, they disclose the commission of cognizable offences. Finding that the allegations were sufficient to cross this threshold, the Court declined to interfere with the criminal proceedings and left the determination of the factual allegations to the Trial Court. However, the Court also recognised the concern regarding unnecessary arrest in Section 498A cases. Relying upon Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) 8 8 SCC 273, it emphasised that invocation of Section 498A does not automatically justify arrest and that the prescribed safeguards and preliminary requirements must be followed. The judgment therefore attempts to strike a balance between ensuring effective protection against cruelty and preventing arbitrary or mechanical use of criminal proceedings.

The Supreme Court held that Section 498A IPC may extend to a genuine “relationship in the nature of marriage,” while every live-in relationship does not qualify as such. The Court declined to quash the proceedings as the allegations prima facie disclosed cognizable offences, while directing strict compliance with arrest safeguards under Arnesh Kumar. Thus, the judgment balances protection against cruelty with safeguards against misuse of criminal law.