Case Name: NEERAJ GUPTA V. PRADEEP KUMAR BANSAL & ORS.   

Petition No.: Criminal Appeal No. ___ of 2026 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 776 of 2020)

Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 660

Date of Judgment: 01.07.2026

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Karol and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh

Relevant Statutes & Provisions:  Sections 156(3), 200, 209 and 244 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 302 Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court considered whether a Magistrate is required to record pre-charge evidence under Section 244 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the CrPC) before committing a complaint case exclusively triable by the Court of Session. Setting aside the Punjab and Haryana High Court’s judgment, the Court held that the Magistrate’s role at the stage of commitment is limited. Once the offence is found to be exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, the Magistrate is only required to commit the case in accordance with Section 209 CrPC.

FACTS

The dispute arose from an altercation on 12.04.2007 during which the appellant’s father collapsed and later died. As no FIR was registered despite repeated complaints, the appellant approached the Judicial Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC. After recording pre-summoning evidence, the Magistrate issued summons and committed the case to the Sessions Court. Charges were framed only against one accused, while two others were discharged. The complainant challenged the discharge before the High Court, which remanded the matter to the Magistrate for recording evidence under Section 244 CrPC before commitment. Aggrieved by this direction, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether a Magistrate must record evidence when the offence is strictly triable by the Court of Sessions, where the allegations were inter alia under section 302 Indian Penal Code, 1860.

ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

The appellant argued that the High Court wrongly directed the Magistrate to record evidence under Section 244 CrPC before committing the case, even though the offences were exclusively triable by the Court of Session. It was submitted that once the requirements of Section 209 CrPC were fulfilled, the Magistrate had no authority to undertake a detailed inquiry. The respondents supported the High Court’s view and contended that recording pre-charge evidence was necessary before commitment. They relied upon Ajoy Kumar Ghose v. State of Jharkhand (2009) 14 SCC 115, Sunil Mehta v. State of Gujarat (2013) 9 SCC 209 and Harinarayan G. Bajaj v. State of Maharashtra (2010) 11 SCC 520 to contend that pre-charge evidence under Section 244 CrPC was mandatory before commitment.

JUDGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

The Court examined the relevant provisions of CrPC and held that Section 244 CrPC applies only to warrant cases triable by a Magistrate and not to cases exclusively triable by the Court of Session. Once the Magistrate is satisfied that the offence falls within the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court, the duty under Section 209 CrPC is limited to committing the case after complying with Sections 207 and 208 CrPC, without recording evidence or examining the merits. The Court also distinguished the judgments relied upon by the High Court, i.e. Ajoy Kumar Ghose v. State of Jharkhand, Sunil Mehta v. State of Gujarat, and Harinarayan G. Bajaj v. State of Maharashtra, as those decisions were rendered in a context where Magistrate had the obvious ambit of powers granted by CrPC to try those cases.

The Court further held that the High Court was not justified in directing the Magistrate to record prosecution evidence before committing the case. Such a course would require witnesses to depose on the same facts more than once, leading to unnecessary delay and defeating the legislative intent of ensuring speedy criminal trials. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied upon the Constitution Bench decision in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 3 SCC 92, which clarified that the Magistrate performs only a limited administrative role at the stage of commitment and is not expected to examine the merits of the case. Reliance was also placed on Supdt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Ashutosh Ghosh (1979) 4 SCC 381, wherein it was held that under CrPC, the only requirement from the Magistrate is to see whether the offence is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions and in doing so, no evidence need be taken. 

While referring to Sanjay Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 2 SCC 39, the Court reaffirmed that the purpose of the Legislature will be frustrated if the Magistrate goes into the merits of the matter at the pre-committal stage. It is in this context that the Court described the power of the Magistrate to be a ‘narrow inspection hole’. The Court also relied upon State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi (2005) 1 SCC 568, wherein it was observed that the committal inquiry under the CrPC resulted in inordinate delay and served no useful purpose. Consequently, the inquiry was dispensed with under the CrPC to ensure the expeditious disposal of cases. Further relying on Rattiram v. State of M.P. (2012) 4 SCC 516, the Court noted that the Law Commission in its 41st Report had recommended the abolition of committal proceedings under the 1973 Code, and the Magistrate’s role at the stage of commitment has been absolutely constricted.

While holding that the High Court proceeded with an erroneous reading of the law, the Court set aside the impugned judgment. The Court directed the High Court to hear the petition of the appellant as well as the one filed by respondent no.2, afresh and decide the same independently. Therefore, the appeal was allowed. 

CONCLUSION

The judgment reaffirms that a Magistrate’s role at the stage of commitment is confined to ensuring compliance with the statutory procedure and committing the case to the Court of Session where the offence is exclusively triable by it. The Court restored the proceedings before the High Court and directed it to decide both pending revision petitions afresh, preferably within nine months. The judgment reiterates that the Magistrate’s role at the stage of commitment is limited and cannot be expanded beyond the statutory scheme of the CrPC.

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