Case Name: PREM CHAND PORWAL AND OTHER ETC. v. JAGADEESH CHANDRA PRAJAPATI AND OTHERS 

Petition Number: CIVIL APPEALS @ SLP (C) NOS.. 16483-85 of 2015

Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 435

Coram: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE VIRAM NATH & HONORABLE MR. JUSTICE NV ANJARIA

INTRODUCTION

The primary question in consideration in this case was whether a writ court while exercising its PIL jurisdiction can adjudicate directly or indirectly on issues concerning the title or ownership of a property which are inherently private in nature. The Court in this case held that a writ court while exercising its PIL jurisdiction should not adjudicate directly or indirectly on the aspects and issues concerning the title or ownership of the property. The court delineated clear boundaries on the powers of writ courts, emphasizing that their role must remain confined to addressing genuine issues of public interest and that they must not transgress into the adjudication of private disputes, such as proprietary or titular claims.

FACTS

The appeal arose from judgments of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in a PIL filed by Respondent No. 1, claiming unauthorised construction of 54 shops by the Municipal Council on ‘Dussehra Maidan’, which was to be reserved for cultural events. It sought demolition of constructions, inquiry against officials, criminal action, and restoration of land as Dussehra Maidan. A complaint was earlier made to the Tehsildar, whose inquiry, based on a Revenue Inspector’s report, confirmed construction but could not determine legality.

The Municipal Council defended its ownership and legality of construction, while the State asserted the land was indeed earmarked as Dussehra Maidan and alleged unauthorised construction and called for eviction and penal proceedings against both the private individuals as well as the Municipal Council.

During proceedings, the High Court passed an order directing the Tehsildar to conclude the proceedings of the case and submit a report. The Tehsildar proceeded ex parte against the Municipal Council and ordered immediate demolition and removal of all the 54 shops which were illegally constructed. Subsequently, the High Court allowed the PIL and directed the demolition of the said shops. The private appellants, who were the allottees and occupants of the subject shops, were not impleaded as parties to the PIL. Consequently, they filed review petitions, which the High Court dismissed, leading to the present appeal. The appellants argued that the High Court erred in dismissing the review petitions as they were necessary parties to the dispute and a non-joinder of a necessary party constituted an error apparent on the face of record.

ISSUES

1. Whether the High Court erred in dismissing the review petitions filed by the appellants?

2. Whether the High Court overstepped the contours of its writ jurisdiction by adjudicating upon issues relating to titular claims?

JUDGMENT AND ANALYSIS

The court ruled that the High Court had committed a manifest mistake in dismissing the review petition. The court emphasised that one of the accepted grounds where the review of a judgment and order can be undertaken is when there exists an ‘error apparent on the face of record’. The court described ‘an error apparent on the face of record’ as one which is self-evident and which can be detected without resorting to a long-drawn process of reasoning. When ‘an error apparent on the face of record’ is noticed or found to exist, the court should not hesitate to exercise the review powers to set right the injustice and restore the justice to the aggrieved party. The court found that since the appellants were in fact allottees-in-possession of the shops in dispute, they were necessary parties against whom the directions were issued by the High Court in their absence. A judgment which is passed in absence of the necessary parties stands directly affected in terms of their rights, making them suffer prejudice. It therefore, has to be treated as tainted by an error apparent on the face of record. In the present case, the High Court ought to have exercised its review jurisdiction and joined the appellants as necessary parties but failed to do so making the dismissal of the review petition unsustainable. With respect to the second issue, the Court observed that both the Municipal Council and the State Government had laid competing claims of ownership over the land on which the shops were constructed. Without determining this foundational question, the High Court could not have conclusively adjudicated the matter. The court relied on Sohan Lal vs. Union of India [(1957) 1 SCC 439] to emphasise that when it comes to deciding and adjudicating questions relating to the title or ownership of the property, it is well settled that jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be exercised to address the questions of such nature. The court observed that public interest jurisdiction of the Constitutional Courts stems from plenary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, and a public interest petition, for its substance, procedure and purpose, is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, travelling into the area to adjudicate the titular issues would be a wrongful exercise of public interest jurisdiction. Consequently, the Apex Court found that the High Court had indeed intruded in the realm of ownership dispute between the Municipal Council and the State Government and that while adjudicating upon the PIL was impermissible.

CONCLUSION

The Apex court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and orders of the High Court on the basis of wrongful exercise of jurisdiction vested under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The court found that the kind and nature of the directions to demolish the shops and the manner in which such directions were passed by the High Court operated to defeat the very idea of public interest. In conclusion, the Court issued a note of caution to High Courts, emphasising that the exercise of public interest jurisdiction must be marked by restraint, discipline, and fidelity to its intended scope, so as to prevent its misuse or overreach into domains beyond its legitimate bounds.