Case Name:   KARAN CHETTRI & ANOTHER v. STATE OF SIKKIM

Petition No.: Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Nos. 8847-8848 of 2025

Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 659

Date of Judgement: 20.05.2026
Coram: Honourable Ms. Justice B.V. Nagarathna & Honourable Mr. Justice Ujjal Bhuyan
Relevant Statutes & Provisions: Section 376D of the Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 450 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 386(b)(iii) and Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

INTRODUCTION

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has, in the present judgment, authoritatively laid down that an accused has no vested right to insist upon the continuance of a sentence which the law itself does not sanction. It was held that where a trial court imposes a sentence below the statutory minimum prescribed under a provision of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’), the appellate court’s act of substituting such an illegal sentence with the lawfully prescribed minimum does not constitute ‘enhancement’ within the meaning of Section 386(b)(iii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘CrPC’). 

FACTS

A FIR was registered against the Appellants under Sections 376D read with Section 34 of the IPC, alleging that the two of them had committed gang rape upon a 52-year-old woman at her residence. Upon completion of investigation and submission of chargesheet, the Sessions Court convicted both Appellants under Sections 376D, 376(2)(l) and 450 read with Section 34 of IPC and sentenced them to rigorous imprisonment of 12 years under Section 376D, a sentence manifestly below the statutory minimum of 20 years prescribed thereunder. In appeals preferred by the Appellants before the High Court of Sikkim, the High Court set aside the conviction under Section 376(2)(l) but upheld the convictions under Sections 376D and 450 read with Section 34 of IPC. Noting that the sentence of twelve years imposed by the Sessions Court was contrary to the statutory mandate of Section 376D, the High Court while exercising suo motu revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 CrPC, enhanced the sentence to 20 years, the prescribed minimum. Aggrieved by the enhancement of sentence in their own appeals, the Appellants approached the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

• Whether, in an appeal against conviction preferred by the accused, the High Court could, in the absence of any appeal or revision by the State or the victim, exercise suo motu revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 CrPC to enhance the sentence while exercising its appellate jurisdiction?

• Whether the bar against enhancement of sentence contained in Section 386(b)(iii) CrPC operates to preclude the appellate court from substituting a sentence imposed below the statutory minimum with the prescribed minimum sentence?

ARGUMENTS OF PARTIES

The Appellants contended that the High Court had committed a breach of Section 386(b)(iii) CrPC inasmuch as, in appeals filed by the Appellants challenging the judgment of conviction and sentence of twelve years, the High Court had exercised suo motu revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 read with Section 401 CrPC and enhanced the sentence to twenty years, thereby leaving the Appellants worse off in their own appeals. The expression ‘but not so as to enhance the same’ in Section 386(b)(iii) CrPC was pressed into service. Alternatively, it was submitted that even if the conviction were to be maintained, the sentence imposed by the Sessions Court may be reiterated.

The Respondent-State contended that the Sessions Court had grossly erred in imposing a sentence of twelve years when the statutory minimum under Section 376D of IPC is twenty years and that the High Court had rightly exercised suo motu revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 read with Section 401 CrPC in order to rectify this gross error and to bring the sentence into conformity with the statutory mandate. It was further submitted that the procedure under the said provisions was duly complied with by affording the accused an opportunity of hearing before the sentence was enhanced.

JUDGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

Regarding the first issue, the Hon’ble Bench held that in an appeal filed by the accused challenging the judgment of conviction and sentence, the High Court cannot, in the absence of any challenge by the State, complainant, or victim, suo motu exercise its revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 CrPC so as to enhance the sentence while exercising appellate jurisdiction. The Court observed that in an appeal from a conviction under Section 386(b) CrPC, the appellate court can acquit or discharge the accused, order a retrial, maintain the conviction while reducing the sentence, or dismiss the appeal, but it cannot, in such an appeal, enhance the sentence.

The Court underscored that an accused who files an appeal against conviction is, at best, seeking reversal of the conviction and setting aside of the sentence; the least the accused can expect is that even if conviction is affirmed, the sentence will be maintained, if not reduced. The Court further referred to the expression ‘but not so as to enhance the same’ in Section 386(b)(iii) and held that the spirit of this provision must be understood to mean that while maintaining the conviction, the High Court cannot exercise suo motu revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 CrPC and simultaneously enhance the sentence against the accused.

Regarding the second issue, the Court carved out a critical and principled distinction between an enhancement of sentence and a correction of an illegal sentence. The Court held that the embargo contained in Section 386(b) CrPC against enhancement assumes that the sentence sought to be interfered with is one lawfully imposed and therefore capable of being protected by the procedural safeguard against aggravation. However, a sentence imposed below the statutory minimum is not merely inadequate, it is one rendered in derogation of the legal mandate and to that extent suffers from a jurisdictional infirmity. The accused can acquire no vested right in the continuance of an order which the law itself does not sanction. 

On this foundation, the Court held that where the Sessions Court had erroneously imposed a sentence of twelve years under Section 376D IPC which mandates rigorous imprisonment for a term not less than twenty years, the High Court’s act of substituting the illegal sentence with the statutory minimum was not an exercise of the power of enhancement under Section 386(b). Rather, it amounted to a suo motu correction of an illegality apparent on the face of the record, undertaken to bring the sentence into conformity with the mandatory statutory requirement.

The source of such action, the Court held, lies not in the power to enhance but in the obligation of the court, acting ex debito justitiae, to correct a patent illegality and ensure that the judgment affirmed by the judicial process is one which the law authorises. The Court further observed that to hold otherwise would mean that a manifestly illegal sentence, merely because it was challenged by the convict and not by the State or the victim, must be perpetuated despite being contrary to the minimum punishment ordained by Parliament, a result which would elevate a procedural limitation over substantive legality and permit the appellate process to become an instrument for preserving an illegality, which can never be the outcome. 

Distinguishing Sachin v. State of Maharashtra (2025) 9 SCC 507, the Court held that the said judgment concerned a lawfully imposed sentence and the facts and circumstances therein were quite distinct from the present case where the Sessions Court had, on a misreading of Section 376D IPC, imposed a sentence below the prescribed statutory minimum. The ratio of Sachin (supra) could therefore not be applied to the facts of the present case.

CONCLUSION

The Hon’ble Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, finding no merit in the contention that the High Court had impermissibly enhanced the sentence in the Appellants’ own appeals. The Court upheld the sentence of twenty years of rigorous imprisonment imposed by the High Court under Section 376D of the IPC, holding that the substitution of the illegal sentence of twelve years with the mandatory minimum of twenty years was not an enhancement of punishment in the true sense but a suo motu correction of an error apparent on the face of the record, restoring legality to the sentencing process. The judgment is a significant clarification of the scope of Section 386(b)(iii) CrPC and the limits of the procedural bar against enhancement of sentence in an appeal preferred by an accused, laying down that such bar cannot confer upon an accused a right to insist upon the continuance of a sentence which the law itself forbids.