Case Name: MARIETTA D’ SILVA V. RUDOLF CLOTHAN LACERDA & ORS.

Petition Number: Civil Appeal 2026 @ SLP(C) No. 31012 of 2025 

Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 496

Date of Judgment: 15.05.26

Coram: HON’BLE  JUSTICE  MANOJ MISRA  & HON’BLE JUSTICE MANMOHAN 

INTRODUCTION

This case is a major eye-opener regarding what a landlord needs to write in their initial court papers when trying to evict a tenant. The Supreme Court cleared up a huge misunderstanding by ruling that a landlord only needs to state the main facts of their case in the initial lawsuit. They do not have to list out all their backend family agreements or proof at the very beginning. With this logic, the Supreme Court overruled a Bombay High Court order and rightfully gave a Mumbai flat back to its owner. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL

A 99-year lease was originally granted to the appellant’s parents, who constructed the Memorare Building in Chembur, Mumbai, containing six flats. Flat no. 2 was let out in 1962 and after the tenant’s death the tenancy continued through his widow and then her heirs. The appellant and her sister later filed an eviction suit in 1993 seeking possession on the grounds of bona fide requirement, alternate accommodation of the tenants and change of user under Section 13 of the Bombay Rent Act. The trial court decreed eviction in 2007, holding that the appellant proved her bona fide requirement and the tenants had alternate accommodation. The appellate bench dismissed the tenant’s appeal in 2017. However, the High Court allowed the tenant’s revision in 2025, setting aside the concurrent decrees and ordered restoration of possession to the tenant. The Supreme Court then heard the appellant’s challenge. 

ISSUE

What constitutes a pleading, what is the distinction between the pleading and proof and as to whether the tests of pleading and proof stand satisfied in the present case ?

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

The Appellant’s (Landlord’s): Marietta had been officially listed as a co-owner on the property’s share certificates since 1987. Her initial lawsuit papers clearly stated that she was a co-landlord and genuinely needed the flat. The internal family arrangement about who gets which flat was just evidence to support her claim after her father died. It wasn’t a formal property division that needed its own legal paperwork in 1993. 

The Respondents (Tenant’s): The tenants claimed that the plaint did not clearly plead how the appellant became landlord, especially after the written statement denied landlord-tenant relationship and raised jurisdictional objections. They relied on the rule that evidence cannot go beyond pleadings and contended that the appellant had tried to improve her case through affidavit evidence and later developments. They also argued that the appellant had not properly established all elements of bonafide requirement and alternate accommodation under the Rent Act.

JUDGMENT AND ANALYSIS

The Court began its analysis by laying down the foundational meaning of the term “pleading”. Drawing from Black’s Law Dictionary (Ninth Edition), it defined a pleading as a formal document in which a party to a legal proceedings sets forth or responds to allegations, claims, denials or defences. Under Order VI Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, “pleading” means either a plaint or a written statement – nothing more, nothing less. The plaint is the plaintiff’s formal statement of claim, setting out the cause of action with all requisite particulars. The written statement is the defendant’s response, dealing with each material fact alleged and introducing any new facts or objections in the defendants’ favour. Order VI Rule 2(1) of CPC prescribes four essential requirements of a valid pleading i.e., it must state facts (not law); material facts only; facts and not evidence; and such facts concisely and with precision. 

The Court emphasised that the rules governing pleadings are not rigid absolutes but guiding principles designed to ensure clarity and precision in framing the case. The object of pleadings is  to assist the Court and the parties in the adjudication of disputes to provide fair notice of the opponent’s case, to ascertain the points of agreement and divergence and thereby to bring the parties to definite issues. The Court then drew a critical distinction between pleading (what must be pleaded) and proof (what must be proved). Order VI Rule 2, CPC mandates that pleadings contain material facts but not the evidence by which they are to be proved. The Court explained this through two well-established Latin maxims facta probanda (materials facts to be proved) and facta probantia (the evidence by which they are proved) 

The Court relied on Virender Nath Gautam vs. Satpal Singh & Ors., (2007) 3 SCC 617, which authoritatively held: “It is settled law that pleadings must contain only facta probanda and not facta probantia. The material facts on which the party relies for his claim are called facta probanda and they must be stated in the pleadings. But the facts or facts by means of which facta probanda (material facts) are proved and which are in the nature of facta probantia (particulars or evidence) need not be set out in the pleadings. They are not facts in issue, but only relevant facts required to be proved at the trial in order to establish the fact in issue” The Court thus crystallised the rule that no evidence can be led on an unpleaded plea, and  no evidence can cure a defect in pleadings but equally, facts which are merely evidentiary in nature need not themselves be pleaded.

The Court further noted that in an eviction suit under the State Rent Act, the Plaintiff need only plead and prove two things: the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship and the statutory ground for eviction. This principle was affirmed in Kanaklata Das & Ors. v. Naba Kumar Das & Ors., (2018) 2 SCC 352. The Appellant’s plaint clearly stated her status as co-landlord and grounds of bona-fide need, relative hardship and the availability of alternative accommodation. The plaint thus contained all material facts essential to the cause of action. 

To prove these pleaded facts, the Appellant filed her affidavit of examination-in-chief deposing upon her co-landlord status, the share certificates, the family arrangement and her genuine need. The Court held that all of this was facta probantia which are legitimately adduced through evidence to establish the materials facts already pleaded and was not required to appear in the plaint itself. Even assuming any deficiency, the Court held that the objection was barred at the revision stage. In Ram Sarup Gupta (Dead) By LRs. vs. Bishun Narain Inter College & Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 555, it was held:“Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised the enquiry should not be so much about the form of the pleadings; instead, the Court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues upon which they went to trial. Once it is found that in spite of deficiency in the pleadings parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on those issues by producing evidence, in that event it would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal.” 

The Court also turned the respondents’ own reliance on Bachhaj Nahar vs. Nilima Mandal, (2008) 17 SCC 491, against them noting that this very authority recognises the exception where parties have proceeded to trial fully knowing the case and led evidence on it, which is precisely what occurred here. Under Section 3 and 8 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, an interest in land necessarily includes an interest in the building standing on it. The share certificates in the Appellant’s name therefore covered both the land and the suit building. Since Section 5(3) of the Bombay Rent Act defines “landlord” as any  person entitled to receive rent, the Appellant as co-owner fell squarely within that definition. The defendant (DW-1) had himself admitted that the building was constructed by the Appellant’s father, leaving no room for doubt. 

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court allowed the present appeal and set aside the Bombay High Court’s judgment and restored the Small Causes Court’s eviction decree. It reaffirmed that in rent-control litigation, pleadings must contain material facts, while proof supplies the evidence to establish them. In practical terms, the judgment strengthens the view that courts should look at the substance of the landlord’s case, not just technical objections, where the parties have fully understood and fought the real issues.