Case Name: R AND OTHERS v. STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS

Petition No.: Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 4846 of 2026

Neutral Citation: 2026:AHC:130283-DB

Date of Judgement: 01.07.2026

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice J.J. Munir and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Achal Sachdev

Relevant Statutes & Provisions: Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (Sections 1(2), 12, 15); Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012; Sections 191(2), 132, 121(1), 352 and 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; Section 2 of the Majority Act, 1875; Section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937

FACTS

On 15.02.2026, police and the Child Line Team, Bulandshahr, proceeded to Village Sunpeda Baksuwa on information of an impending marriage of a minor girl, aged about 16 years. On the team disclosing its intention to produce her before the Child Welfare Committee, the petitioners, nineteen in number, besides fifty others unknown, abused the Police and the Child Line Team personnel, threatened them and forcibly took away the victim from the custody of the Child Line Committee. An FIR was registered at P.S. Kakor, Bulandshahr, under Sections 191(2), 132, 121(1), 352 and 351(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, for obstructing public servants in discharge of duty. The nineteen named petitioners approached the High Court seeking quashing of the FIR, contending that under Muslim Personal Law they were within their rights to proceed with the marriage.

ISSUE

Whether a minor married under the Muslim Law is governed by the provisions of Personal Law, or by the PCMA and the POCSO Act?

ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

The petitioners contended that under Shariat Law, a girl who has attained puberty, generally regarded as 15 years, is competent to marry, and that the PCMA does not affect this personal law. Reliance was placed on Section 2 of the Majority Act, 1875, which carries a non obstante clause excluding laws relating to marriage from the stipulated age of majority, and on Section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, which makes Muslim Personal Law the rule of decision in matters of marriage. It was further argued that no medical report justified invocation of Sections 121(1) and 132 BNS, no overt acts were assigned to the petitioners, the ingredients of Section 351(2) BNS were not disclosed as no alarm was caused, and there was no independent witness to the incident. The State opposed the petition, defending the statutory duty exercised by the police and the Child Line Team in rescuing the minor and contending that the allegations disclosed cognizable offences warranting investigation. 

JUDGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

The Court held that it was in complete agreement with Moidutty Musliyar and others v. Sub Inspector Vadakkencherry Police Station and others 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 4188, that no personal law can wipe out the prohibition of child marriage brought about by the PCMA, and the effect of the POCSO Act, which renders sexual intercourse with a child, a crime. It held that the age of marriage, for every citizen of the country, irrespective of religion, is that, that is spelt out by the PCMA, and that since carnal relations being inseparable from the institution of marriage, permitting marriage below 18 years would be an acknowledged violation of the POCSO Act. The Court reasoned that the PCMA, being a later, all-encompassing statute extending to all citizens under Section 1(2), would prevail over the exception made in the Majority Act, 1875, notwithstanding the non obstante clauses relied upon by the petitioners. 

The Court took note of the Supreme Court’s decision in Independent Thought v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 800, and of the suggestions in Society For Enlightenment & Voluntary Action v. Union of India 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2922, where the Union had proposed that the PCMA be declared to prevail over personal laws, and observed that despite a genuine conflict of opinion among High Courts and a still-pending question before the Supreme Court, the Parliament has not legislated in terms of what the Supreme Court was expecting in Society For Enlightenment & Voluntary Action (supra). However, the Court reiterated that Shariat Law providing for puberty as the competent age under the law permissible for a girl to marry or be married, runs clearly in the teeth of the PCMA as well as the POCSO Act. 

The Court further held that the police and Child Line Team, in attempting the rescue, were indeed acting within the four corners of law and most certainly in the bona fide discharge of their duties, and that the allegations of abuse, threats and forcible removal of the minor from official custody made out a prima facie case of obstruction in the performance of duties of a government servant. Rejecting the petitioners’ contentions on the absence of a medical report and independent witnesses, the Court held that such matters would be the subject matter of the charge-sheet submitted after investigation, or may be, the charge, if framed by the Trial Court, and that it was not at all a fit case to interdict investigation at an incipient stage by quashing the FIR.

CONCLUSION

The Allahabad High Court dismissed the writ petition and vacated the interim stay order, holding that the FIR disclosed cognizable offences warranting investigation. The judgment reaffirms that the PCMA and the POCSO Act constitute uniform, all-India child protection legislation that no personal law, including Shariat law on the age of marriageable puberty, can override, while leaving the specific involvement of individual petitioners to be tested at trial.

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