Case Name: PARVEEN KUMAR@ PARVEEN CHAUHAN vs STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.    

Petition No.: Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.9920 of 2026

Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 667
Date of Judgement: 01.07.2026
Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Karol & Hon’ble Mr. Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh
Relevant Statutes & Provisions: Article 161 of Constitution of India; Sections 432, 433, and 433-A of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Policy Regarding Release of Life Convicts, 2002 and Premature Release of Life Convicts, 2008 Policy issued by the Jails and Judicial Department, Government of Haryana.

INTRODUCTION

The Hon’ble Supreme Court, allowing an appeal by a life convict against rejection of his claim for premature release, has reaffirmed that an exercise of constitutional power under Article 161 cannot be overridden by a subsequent statutory policy. A remission policy contemplating orders from the Governor is constitutional in character, and a later policy framed under Sections 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 cannot denude a convict of its benefit. The Court also restated the doctrine of per incuriam, holding that a precedent’s binding force turns on the strength of the Bench that rendered it, not on the number of judges taking a contrary view.

FACTS

The Appellant, convicted of murdering a twelve-year-old child, was sentenced to life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC, a conviction that attained finality in 2015. After serving over fourteen years, he sought premature release under the ‘Policy Regarding Release of Life Convicts, 2002’ of Haryana. His representation was rejected on the ground that he was governed by the subsequent ‘Premature Release of Life Convicts, 2008’ Policy, under which he had not completed the requisite sentence. His writ petition, founded on State of Haryana v. Jagdish, was dismissed by the High Court, giving rise to this appeal.

ISSUES

1. Whether the Appellant’s application for grant of remission is to be governed by the ‘Policy Regarding Release of Life Convicts, 2002’, framed in exercise of the power conferred under Article 161 of the Constitution of India, or by the subsequent ‘Premature Release of Life Convicts, 2008’ Policy, framed under Sections 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
2. Whether the decision of the coordinate Bench in State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar (2021) 9 SCC 292, which held both the 2002 and 2008 Policies to be statutory in character, is rendered per incuriam for being in conflict with the ratio of the three-judge Bench decision in State of Haryana v. Jagdish (2010) 4 SCC 216.

ARGUMENTS OF PARTIES

The Appellant submitted that since the 2002 Policy was framed under the Governor’s power under Article 161, the subsequent statutory 2008 Policy could not denude him of its benefit, and that the more liberal policy in force at the time of consideration ought to prevail. It was further contended that State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar, which categorised the 2002 Policy as statutory, could not bind, since it conflicted with the larger three-judge Bench ratio in State of Haryana v. Jagdish.

The Respondent-State submitted that the 2008 Policy had superseded all earlier memoranda and, being operative on the date of conviction, alone governed the Appellant’s case. Relying on Raj Kumar, it was submitted that both Policies were statutory instruments traceable to the CrPC, and the 2002 Policy held no higher pedestal merely for seeking the Governor’s concurrence.

JUDGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

Regarding the first issue, the Court compared the source of power underlying the two Policies. The policies of 2000 and 2002 required papers to be placed before the Governor for orders under Article 161, whereas the 2008 Policy directed files to the Chief Minister for orders under Section 432 CrPC. Highlighting this difference, the Court observed the constitutional ambit of the former and statutory ambit of the latter. The Court further noted that it cannot be said that a statutory policy, even if it may be so, cannot override an exercise of power under Article 161, for that power is distinct and independent, uninfluenced by any other power, more so statutory in nature. 

Relying on the three-judge Bench in State of Haryana v. Jagdish (2010) 4 SCC 216, which had held the 1993 Policy, similarly framed under Article 161, could not be overridden by a statutory policy “subordinate to the Constitution”, and that a more liberal policy prevailing at the time of consideration must be extended to the convict, the Court, through a tabulated comparison of the 1993, 2002, and 2008 Policies, found the 2002 Policy structurally identical to the 1993 Policy, and held that since the former had already been declared constitutional by a larger Bench, “the inescapable conclusion would be that the identical later policy would also be the same”. The 2008 Policy could not, therefore, override the 2002 Policy in the Appellant’s case, and the ratio in State of Haryana v. Jagdish continued to entitle him to its benefit.

Regarding the second issue, the Court laid down the governing principles for determining when a decision is rendered per incuriam. Drawing upon a plethora of judgments, the Court reaffirmed that this doctrine is an exception to stare decisis to be applied sparingly; a judgment is per incuriam where its ratio is irreconcilable with an earlier decision of a Bench of equal or higher strength, or when a particular provision or a statute or a rule or a regulation has not been brought to the attention of the Court. It applies only to the ratio decidendi, not obiter dicta. The Court further held that judicial discipline requires a Bench disagreeing with a coordinate Bench, absent a controlling precedent, to refer the matter to a Bench of three judges. 

Crucially, the Court emphasised that it is not the numerical strength of judges taking a particular view that is relevant but it is instead the strength of the Bench, which is the determinative factor of the binding nature of a particular view. Applying these principles to Raj Kumar, which had relied on N. Mani v. Sangeetha Theatre (2004) 12 SCC 278 to treat the 2002 Policy as a statutory instrument, the Court held that this disregarded its structural identity with the 1993 Policy already held constitutional in Jagdish, and would therefore “fall foul of the reasoning in Jagdish supra and hence be rendered per incuriam”. Since a controlling precedent in Jagdish already existed, no reference to a larger Bench was warranted. The Court clarified that its findings would apply prospectively, without reopening remission applications already decided.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the ‘Policy Regarding Release of Life Convicts, 2002’ continued to govern the Appellant’s case, and directed the State of Haryana to decide his remission application accordingly within four weeks. The judgment reaffirms that an exercise of constitutional power under Article 161 cannot be diluted by a subsequent statutory policy, and authoritatively restates the doctrine of per incuriam, that a precedent’s binding character turns on the strength of the Bench that rendered it, not the number of decisions taking a contrary view.