Case Name: Nisha Pradeep Pandya v. Union of India & Ors.
Petition Number: WRIT PETITION NO. 1085 OF 2023
Neutral Citation: 2026:BHC-OS: 11417-DB
Date of Judgment: 04.05.2026
Coram: HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE BHARTI DANGRE & HON’BLE JUSTICE MS. MANJUSHA DESHPANDE
Relevant Provisions: Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
INTRODUCTION
The dispute in this case concerned the constitutional validity of the 2021 amendments to the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (JJ Act) and the 2022 Rules, which substituted the jurisdiction of “Courts” in adoption proceedings with the “District Magistrate.” The petitioners contended that this substitution violated the doctrine of separation of powers and, consequently, the basic structure of the Constitution. The Court rejected this challenge, holding that the legislative change did not amount to a constitutional infirmity, emphasizing the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amendment, the continued centrality of the Central Adoption Resource Authority (CARA) in regulating and monitoring adoptions, and the fact that the District Magistrate already performs significant quasi-judicial and supervisory functions within the child protection framework.
FACTS
The petitions challenged the constitutionality of the 2021 amendments to the JJ Act and the 2022 Rules, which replaced the word “Court” with “District Magistrate” in adoption proceedings. The petitioners argued that transferring powers from judicial courts to executive authorities such as the District Magistrate and Collector violated Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution and undermined the basic structure doctrine, particularly the principles of equality and separation of powers. The second petition specifically concerned a foreign adoption application and questioned the validity of vesting judicial functions in executive officers under the amended framework governing adoption procedures.
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
The petitioners argued that the 2021 amendment to the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, replacing “Court” with “District Magistrate” in adoption matters, was unconstitutional and arbitrary. They contended that adoption involves sensitive judicial functions concerning child welfare, which require judicial expertise and supervision rather than executive control. They relied on Lakshmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India [(1984) 2 SCC 244], to stress upon the importance of judicial scrutiny in safeguarding children from exploitation and ensuring suitable adoptive parents. The petitioners further argued that District Magistrates lack adequate legal expertise, infrastructure, and enforcement powers, making the amendment violative of Articles 14, 21, and the doctrine of separation of powers.
On the other hand, the respondents argued that the challenge to the 2021 amendment of the JJ Act was merely academic since the petitioners had neither initiated nor participated in any adoption proceedings. The respondent contended that the amendment aimed to reduce delays in adoption cases and strengthen child protection by empowering District Magistrates to coordinate adoption-related agencies effectively. According to the respondents, adoption proceedings are non-adversarial and primarily administrative in nature. They asserted that District Magistrates already perform quasi-judicial functions under several statutes and were adequately trained to handle adoption matters while ensuring compliance with statutory safeguards and child welfare standards.
ISSUE
Whether the substitution of courts with the District Magistrate for granting adoption orders under the amended adoption framework violates constitutional principles, particularly the doctrine of separation of powers and the right to judicial remedy, or whether such substitution is legally valid to ensure expeditious disposal of adoption proceedings?
JUDGMENT AND ANALYSIS
The Court at the outset undertook a detailed analysis of the statutory framework governing adoption and concluded that the amendment merely altered the forum for granting adoption orders without diluting substantive safeguards protecting child welfare.
The Court emphasized that adoption proceedings are non-adversarial and already governed by a comprehensive regulatory mechanism under the supervision of Central Adoption Resource Authority (CARA). It observed that CARA and the Adoption Regulations provide exhaustive safeguards, including home study reports, scrutiny of prospective adoptive parents, in-camera proceedings, strict timelines, and post-adoption monitoring. The Court noted that “the whole process of adoption is well chartered by the Statutory Authority CARA,” ensuring that adoption decisions remain child-centric and welfare-oriented.
The court rejected the contention that the amendment violated the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court held that executive authorities frequently discharge quasi-judicial functions under various statutes. It highlighted the District Magistrate’s existing role within the child protection framework and under statutes such as the CrPC, Arms Act, National Security Act, and Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act. The Court found that District Magistrates possess sufficient administrative and quasi-judicial competence to oversee adoption proceedings effectively.
The judgment further relied on the legislative intent behind the amendment, namely expediting adoption proceedings that had suffered delays under the earlier court-based system. The court ultimately upheld the constitutional validity of the 2021 amendment to the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, which substituted the “Court” with the “District Magistrate” as the authority empowered to issue adoption orders.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Bombay High Court upheld the 2021 JJ Act amendment, holding that replacing courts with District Magistrates in adoption proceedings is constitutionally valid. The Court found no violation of separation of powers or Articles 14 and 21, emphasizing that the change enhances efficiency while maintaining adequate safeguards for child welfare through CARA oversight. Consequently, the writ petition stood dismissed.
