Case Name: KAILASH CHNADRA KAPRI V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
Petition No.: Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 6564 of 2026
Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 473
Date of Judgement: 29th April 2026
Coram: Honourable Mr Justice JB Pardiwala and Honourable Mr Justice Ujjal Bhuyan
Relevant Provisions: Article 21 of the Constitution of India; Article 226 of the Constitution of India; Section 528 Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Sections 147, 323 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 120 of the Railways Act; Section 482 CrPC
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court, in the present case, reaffirmed that the right to a speedy trial is an integral part of Article 21 of the Constitution and extends to every stage of criminal proceedings, whether the accused is in custody or on bail. The Court quashed criminal proceedings that had remained pending for nearly thirty-five years against a former Uttar Pradesh police constable, holding that continuation of such proceedings in a trivial criminal case amounted to oppression, abuse of process, and a violation of the accused’s constitutional right to live with dignity.
FACTS
An FIR dated 19 February 1989 was lodged by a constable, against the appellant and four other police constables, alleging offences under Sections 147, 323 and 504 of the IPC along with Section 120 of the Railways Act. The allegations arose out of a minor altercation in a police mess relating to food, where the complainant alleged that the accused constables assaulted and abused him.
Upon completion of the investigation, a chargesheet was filed, culminating in a criminal case before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate. During the pendency of proceedings, two co-accused died, while the remaining two co-accused were acquitted because the prosecution failed to examine even a single witness despite the case remaining pending for more than three decades. The trial court recorded that all prosecution witnesses were police personnel and that repeated attempts, including issuance of summons and radiograms to senior police authorities, failed to secure their attendance. Consequently, prosecution evidence was closed in May 2022.
The appellant approached the Allahabad High Court under Section 482 CrPC, seeking quashing of the proceedings on the grounds of extraordinary delay and violation of Article 21. However, the High Court refused to quash the proceedings, holding that disputed questions of fact could not be adjudicated under Section 482 CrPC. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.
ISSUES
1. Whether criminal proceedings pending for thirty-five years deserved to be quashed on the ground that the accused’s fundamental right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution had been violated.
- Whether continuation of prosecution in a trivial criminal matter, where co-accused had already been acquitted for want of evidence, would amount to oppression and abuse of the process of law.
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
The appellant contended that the criminal proceedings had remained pending for an unconscionable period of thirty-five years without any meaningful progress and that such prolonged prosecution violated his fundamental right to a speedy trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. It was argued that the case arose out of a trivial dispute among police constables, that the co-accused had already been acquitted owing to total absence of evidence, and that continuation of proceedings against the appellant would serve no useful purpose except harassment and mental agony. The appellant further submitted that he had suffered severe prejudice because the mere pendency of criminal proceedings for decades adversely affected his dignity, reputation, peace of mind and social standing.
The State, on the other hand, contended that proceedings against the appellant could not continue alongside those against the co-accused because, after the bifurcation of Uttar Pradesh, he had been transferred to Uttarakhand and could not be served with summons. The State opposed quashing and maintained that the criminal proceedings should be allowed to continue in accordance with the law.
JUDICIAL REASONING
The Supreme Court undertook an extensive analysis of the constitutional jurisprudence on the right to a speedy trial and held that it is an inseparable component of Article 21. The Court observed that a speedy trial is not dependent on the gravity of the offence or the accused’s custodial status, and applies equally whether the accused is in jail or on bail.
The Court noted that if continuation of criminal proceedings would result in a violation of Article 21, constitutional courts should not hesitate to invoke their inherent powers under Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023 or their writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The bench referred extensively to precedents, including Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar AIR 1979 SC 1369, A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak AIR 1992 SC 1701, P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka AIR 2002 SC 1856, and several American decisions such as Barker v. Wingo (1972) 33 Law Ed, and Richard M. Smith v. Hooey (1969) 21 Law Ed 2d 607. The Court reiterated that a speedy trial is implicit in the guarantee of fair, just and reasonable procedure under Article 21 and encompasses every stage of criminal proceedings, including investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and retrial.
Relying particularly on A.R. Antulay, the Court emphasised that no rigid outer time limit can be prescribed for criminal trials and that every case must be assessed on its own facts by balancing several factors such as the nature of the offence, reasons for delay, conduct of parties, systemic delays and prejudice caused to the accused. However, the Court also observed that inordinate delay may, in itself, amount to presumptive proof of prejudice.
The Court noted that the stigma attached to being an accused person deprives an individual of full human dignity. It held that criminal prosecution affects reputation, standing in society, finances, vocation and mental peace, and therefore, speedy trial must be recognised not merely as a procedural safeguard but as a human right. The bench observed that society has a dual interest in criminal justice: not only in ensuring that guilty persons are punished swiftly, but also in ensuring that innocent persons obtain an early opportunity to clear the cloud of suspicion hanging over them.
Applying these principles to the present case, the Court noted that the allegations pertained to a trivial altercation over food among police constables in a police mess. The offences alleged were simple hurt and criminal intimidation. The Court further observed that the prosecution had completely failed to produce any evidence against the co-accused even after thirty-three years, leading to their acquittal. Significantly, all prosecution witnesses were police personnel themselves, yet the prosecution failed to secure their attendance despite repeated attempts.
The Court found that there was no justification whatsoever for allowing criminal proceedings to remain pending for thirty-five years. It observed that keeping a person in “suspended animation” for such an extraordinarily long period was wholly inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee of fair procedure. The Court remarked that quick justice is a sine qua non of Article 21 and that allowing the prosecution to continue in such circumstances would amount to unfairness, oppression, and an abuse of the judicial process.
The Court also criticised the approach adopted by the High Court while dismissing the appellant’s petition under Section 482 CrPC. It held that the High Court failed to appreciate the constitutional dimension of the right to speedy trial and mechanically treated the matter as involving disputed questions of fact. According to the Supreme Court, constitutional courts are duty-bound to intervene where the continuation of proceedings itself becomes unconstitutional.
Ultimately, the Court concluded that permitting the prosecution to continue after thirty-five years in a case involving minor offences and no prosecutorial progress would be manifestly unjust and violative of Article 21.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the criminal proceedings pending against the appellant. The Court held that continuation of the prosecution after thirty-five years in a trivial criminal matter constituted a violation of the appellant’s fundamental right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.
