Case Name: VIJAYAKUMAR V. STATE OF TAMIL NADU
Petition No.: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2859 OF 2025
Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 525
Date of Judgement: 22nd May, 2026
Coram: Honourable Mr Justice Sanjay Karol & Honourable Mr Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh
Relevant Provisions: Sections 503, 506 Part II, 354C, 376 and 493 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860; Sections 106, 114 and 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Article 21 of the Constitution of India
INTRODUCTION
In a significant pronouncement on women’s dignity, privacy, and sexual autonomy in the digital age, the Supreme Court of India held that the concept of “unchastity” under criminal law cannot be understood through archaic patriarchal notions of morality. Instead, it must be interpreted in light of constitutional values of dignity, decisional autonomy, privacy, and sexual self-determination protected under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court upheld the conviction of the appellant under Part II of Section 506 IPC for criminal intimidation after he threatened to upload on Facebook a secretly recorded bathing video of the prosecutrix.
FACTS
A complaint was lodged in 2015, where the prosecutrix alleged that she had been in a romantic relationship with the appellant for approximately two years. During the course of the relationship, the appellant allegedly recorded a video of her while she was taking a bath by secretly leaving a mobile phone camera switched on inside the bathroom.
According to the prosecution, the appellant later informed the prosecutrix about the existence of the video and assured her that he would delete it. However, disputes subsequently arose between them. The prosecutrix alleged that when she attempted to contact the appellant, he threatened that if she continued calling him, he would upload the bathing video on Facebook and tarnish her reputation. The prosecutrix also alleged that the appellant induced her into a sexual relationship on the promise of marriage and emotionally manipulated her during her pregnancies.
The Trial Court acquitted the appellant of offences under Sections 376 IPC, 493 IPC and 354C IPC. However, it convicted him under Part II of Section 506 IPC for criminal intimidation involving a threat to impute unchastity to a woman. The conviction was affirmed by the Madras High Court, following which the appellant approached the Supreme Court.
ISSUES
1. Whether threatening to upload a woman’s bathing video on social media amounts to threatening to impute “unchastity” within the meaning of Part II of Section 506 IPC?
- Whether the absence of recovery of the alleged mobile phone or video recording was fatal to the prosecution’s case?
- Whether the oral testimony of the prosecutrix was sufficiently credible to sustain a conviction?
- Whether Sections 106 and 114 of the Evidence Act could be invoked in the context of an intimate relationship where facts were within the “special knowledge” of the accused and prosecutrix?
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
The appellant argued that the prosecution had failed to establish the existence of the alleged video because the mobile phone and video recording were never recovered during the investigation. It was contended that in the absence of the primary electronic evidence, a conviction under Sections 503 and 506 IPC could not be sustained. The appellant also challenged the credibility of the prosecutrix’s testimony and argued that material improvements and omissions existed in her statements.
The State, on the other hand, contended that recovery of the mobile phone was not a sine qua non for conviction and that the consistent testimony of the prosecutrix, corroborated by surrounding circumstances and witness statements, clearly established the threat issued by the appellant. It was further argued that threatening to publish a woman’s nude bathing video on social media constituted a direct assault on her dignity, privacy, reputation, and sexual autonomy and therefore amounted to imputing unchastity under Section 506 IPC.
JUDGEMENT AND ANALYSIS
The judgment, authored by Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, analysed the meaning of “unchastity” under criminal law. The Court observed that historically, Indian law associated chastity with patriarchal notions of female sexual virtue and morality. Constitutional jurisprudence has undergone a paradigm shift away from these gendered and patriarchal conceptions. Reliance was placed extensively on the Constitution Bench decision in Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39, in which Section 497 of the IPC, which criminalised adultery, was struck down as unconstitutional. The Court reproduced observations from Joseph Shine recognising that society has historically imposed unequal standards of sexual morality upon women and that antiquated conceptions of “chastity” and “honour” deprived women of dignity and privacy.
The Court further relied on Pawan Kumar v. State of H.P. (2017) 7 SCC 780, in which the Supreme Court recognised that a woman has an absolute right to dignity, freedom, and choice in matters of love and relationships. Building upon these precedents, the Court held that chastity can no longer be viewed merely through the lens of sexual morality. Instead, it must be understood from the perspective of a woman’s dignity, autonomy, freedom to make decisions, and control over her own sexual choices. The Court expressly stated that chastity of a woman should be understood as a person’s control over their own sexual choices, in light of freedom of self-determination. It is the ability to determine one’s own sexual choices and one’s own sexual relationships without interference from another.
The Court then relied heavily on the privacy jurisprudence developed in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1, and observed that the dignity of an individual encompasses autonomy over fundamental personal choices and control over the dissemination of personal information. Any consensual sexual act is one that an individual, more particularly a woman, would reasonably want to keep private and retain autonomy over, and is, therefore, an act that deserves protection. Therefore, ‘unchastity’, the court noted, should be read also as an action that interferes with the privacy and autonomy of one’s own consensual sexual activities.
Applying these constitutional principles, the Court held that consensual sexual activity and intimate moments are matters which individuals reasonably expect to remain private. Any interference with such privacy and sexual autonomy would amount to an assault on dignity and therefore constitute imputing “unchastity”. The Court clarified that such protection extends irrespective of a person’s sexual history and referred to Section 53A of the Evidence Act to emphasise that sexually active persons are equally entitled to dignity and privacy protections.
Significantly, the Court contextualised dignity within the realities of the digital age. It was observed that in the age of the internet, a person’s dignity and reputation are intrinsically connected to their online identity and perception. Circulation of private content online not only harms reputation but also directly invades privacy and personhood. Consequently, any act that seeks to tarnish a woman’s dignity connected to her sexual autonomy and identity amounts to an assault on her chastity.
The Court then specifically examined the facts of the present case. With respect to the first issue, it held that a person naturally possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy while disrobing in a bathroom. Publication of images or videos depicting nakedness taken in such a setting would unquestionably violate privacy and dignity. Accordingly, threatening to upload such a video on Facebook constituted a threat to impute unchastity within the meaning of Part II, Section 506 of the IPC.
The Court further observed that even though the video did not depict an overt sexual act, recording a woman in a naked state in contemporary digital society creates heightened vulnerability because such material can easily be manipulated, sexualised, and circulated beyond the victim’s control. The Court emphasised that intimate relationships do not confer any right on one partner to publicly circulate or weaponise private content about the other.
On the ingredients of criminal intimidation under Sections 503 and 506 of the IPC, the Court held that the focus must primarily be on the victim’s perception and the alarm caused to her, rather than on whether the threat could ultimately be carried out. The Court illustrated this principle through the example of a toy gun used to instil fear, observing that the offence is complete once a threat intentionally causes alarm, compelling a person to act or refrain from acting in a particular manner. It held that the mere threat of uploading a nude bathing video on social media would naturally cause severe distress, shame, fear, and embarrassment to any woman. The threat was specifically intended to compel the prosecutrix to stop contacting the appellant. Hence, all ingredients of criminal intimidation were satisfied.
The Court next addressed the issue of non-recovery of the mobile phone and video recording. It held that recovery of the article of crime is not an indispensable prerequisite for conviction if reliable evidence otherwise establishes the offence. The Court therefore proceeded to evaluate the credibility of the prosecutrix’s testimony. Referring to Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras 1957 AIR(SC) 614, the Court reiterated that the quality of evidence is more important than quantity and that conviction can rest upon the testimony of a single wholly reliable witness. The Court observed that despite extensive cross-examination, the defence failed to fundamentally discredit the prosecutrix’s testimony or provide any alternative version of events. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the testimony of the prosecutrix was credible and trustworthy, and was sufficiently corroborated by surrounding circumstances and witness statements.
An important aspect of the judgment concerned the interpretation of Section 106 of the Evidence Act. The Court held that “special knowledge” under Section 106 is not confined to physical spaces such as homes or crime scenes but can also extend to intimate interpersonal relationships. Since the relationship between the appellant and prosecutrix was deeply private and lasted nearly two years, facts concerning conversations and incidents occurring within that intimate sphere were naturally within their exclusive knowledge. The Court relied upon Shambu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer (1956) 1 SCC 337, to clarify that Section 106 does not relieve the prosecution of its primary burden but applies where facts are especially within the accused’s knowledge.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the appellant’s conviction under Section 506 (2) of the Indian Penal Code. However, considering that the incident dated back to 2015, the Court reduced the sentence to the period already undergone. The judgment is significant as it expressly rejects patriarchal understandings of “unchastity” rooted in outdated moral notions and instead interprets the expression in harmony with constitutional guarantees of privacy, dignity, and sexual autonomy under Article 21.
