REDISCOVERY OF A FACT ALREADY DISCOVERED CANNOT BE ADMITTED UNDER SECTION 27 OF EVIDENCE ACT: SUPREME COURT

Case Name: ANAND JAKKAPPA PUJARI @GADDADAR V. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA 

Petition Number: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1864 OF 2024 ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO. 3788 OF 2022 

Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 417 

Date of Judgement: 27.04.2026

Coram: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE J.B. PARDIWALA AND HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE K. V. VISWANATHAN

 

INTRODUCTION

The above case is an important precedent with regard to interpretation of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, which is now Section 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, wherein the Supreme Court examined the distinction of discovery of facts under Section 27 and reliance on last seen theory and other circumstantial evidence as the basis for conviction of murder. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The deceased, a 52-year-old woman, was taken in a car by the Accused A1 who was her elder brother, after visiting her daughter and younger brother. She was stated to have never returned after visiting two stores, during which two other accused entered the car as per witness statements, thereafter her phone being switched off since 5:30 P.M. Her dismembered body parts were discovered four days later in a forest area. She was identified by PW1, her son. According to the FSL Report, the cause of death was head injury. The body was found to be burnt. The gold ornaments of the deceased were also missing. The complainant in his FIR, had stated that A1 had borrowed 20 lakhs from his deceased mother and additionally, a gold chain was given as security in exchange and was repeatedly avoiding its repayment. The accused also sold ten acres of ancestral land from which the deceased had asked to give a rightful share to their younger brother. Therefore, the motive was established to be the escape of A1 from all his liabilities, leading him to kill the deceased. Thus, A1 and three other accused were charged with Murder, Robbery and for destroying Evidence. The Sessions Court held them to be guilty and sentenced them to life imprisonment. The High Court affirmed the conviction and dismissed the appeal of the Accused. The Accused A-2 and A-4 preferred Appeal before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES

  1. Whether statements of multiple accused pointing to the same location or object, already discovered through the first accused qualifies as a valid distinct fact under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act?
  2. Whether the High Court committed any error in passing the impugned judgment and order? 

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

The Counsels for the Appellants submitted that the deceased being in charge of the financial transactions of the family and owning 100 Acres of land, she could have had enmity with anyone and there was no evidence to prove the specific enmity of the Accused with the deceased. Hence, the motive was not established. It was further argued that since no Test Identification Parade was conducted, the testimony of PW-7 who identified the Accused getting into the car, could not be relied upon. Additionally, the statement of A-1 was argued to be erroneously considered as a joint statement of all the Accused as no new facts were discovered from the spot where the body was found from each of the accused independently. While the prosecution case rested on the cause of death as strangulation, the Counsels contended that the FSL and Postmortem Report contradicted it as head injury. It was also contended that the case only relied on the last seen theory of PW-7, which is insufficient for conviction.

The Counsel for the Respondent contended that there was a complete chain of evidence as the deceased was last seen with the Accused and the discovery of material evidence in the presence of the Accused. It was further argued that the voluntary statements of the Accused led to the discovery of facts connected to the crime. The testimonies of the Prosecution Witnesses were argued to establish the motive and conspiracy of the Accused to kill the deceased. 

JUDGEMENT AND ANALYSIS

The judgement commences with the Court pertinently noting that the entire case is based on Circumstantial Evidence. Quoting Paragraph 32 in Wigmore on Evidence, the Court explained that the admissibility of evidence will be affirmed when the desired conclusion is more probable and natural than all other hypotheses, provided that even the possibility of a single other hypothesis, if proven to be the true explanation, is more probable and natural, then the desired conclusion becomes inadmissible. 

The Court quoted the main principles of Circumstantial Evidence thereafter:

  • Circumstantial Evidence must consistently point to a single reasonable or rational hypothesis.
  • The burden of proof lies on the Accused when there is a more natural and probable hypothesis than the other from the proved incriminating facts, pointing to the guilt of the Accused.
  • However, the Court cannot rely on a less probable hypothesis from the proved incriminating facts for conviction and should acquit the accused, regardless of whether he gave an explanation.
  • If the inference of guilt from the proved incriminating facts is an equally probable hypothesis as any other, the Court can give an opportunity to the Accused to explain. If he fails or refuses, an inference of guilt may be taken and the Court can admit it as an additional circumstantial fact or the Court can take judicial notice of the other hypothesis and acquit the accused without asking his explanation. 

The Court quoted Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116, in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court had laid down the test of satisfying evidence:

  • The circumstances from which guilt is drawn should be fully established; not merely ‘may be proved’ but ‘must be’ or ‘should be’ proved.
  • There shouldn’t be any other hypotheses other than the one pointing to the guilt of the accused.
  • It should not leave behind even a single reasonable ground for conclusion of the innocence of the accused, that in all probability, the act was done by the accused. 

The Court noted that the personal motive of the Appellants A2 and A4 were not established by the Prosecution; they were only accomplices. While the Court acknowledged that the deceased was last seen with the Appellants in the car, it emphasised that it is risky to conclude only based on the ‘Last Seen Circumstance’ and that it has to be corroborated. The Court examined if there was other incriminating evidence corroborating the Last Seen Theory. However, the Court found that there were no particular exact statements deposed by PW-4 with regard to the Appellants and his statements only mentioned about A1 specifically. 

The Conditions to qualify Section 27 of the Evidence Act were listed as follows:

  • Discovery of fact upon information received from the Accused.
  • The Discovery must be deposed to.
  • The accused, while giving information, must be in police custody.
  • The information relates distinctly to the fact. 

Quoting Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor 1946 SCC Online PC 47, the Court offered an example: “Information supplied by a person in custody that “I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house” does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added “with which I stabbed A” these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant.” 

While the Court acknowledged that joint statements shall not be discarded per se, it is uncertain in the present case whether the statements of the Appellants were given separately and at what time, all pointing to the same mental fact, which fails Section 27 as it does not draw any distinction. The Court clarified that the statements of the Accused made in succession is considered in ‘joint’ when it leads to discovery of different facts from different places.

Therefore, on the ground that further information given did not lead to the discovery of a new fact but the same fact, the Court held that the High Court committed an error in affirming the conviction. 

CONCLUSION

Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the prosecution had not proved the case beyond reasonable doubt, relying only on the ‘Last Seen Theory’ and accordingly acquitted the Appellants of all charges.

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